Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective
Volume 1 | Number 2

Article 1

June 2010

Africa's Debt Crisis: Perspectives on Nigeria's
Escape from External Debt Trap
Solomon O. Akinboye
University of Lagos, Nigeria, sakinboye@unilag.edu.ng

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jgi
Part of the African Studies Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, and the
International Economics Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Akinboye, Solomon O. (2010) "Africa's Debt Crisis: Perspectives on Nigeria's Escape from External Debt Trap," Journal of Global
Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective: Vol. 1 : No. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jgi/vol1/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.

Journal for Global Initiatives 1(2) (2006). pp. 79-94

Africa's Debt Crisis: Perspectives on Nigeria's
Escape from External Debt Trap
Solomon o. Akinboye

Abstract
In sharp contrast with the image of an "oil-rich" country, Nigeria
is paradoxically a heavily indebted poor country. While the
country's oil production reached 2.5 million barrels per day in
2004, its total external debt stock at the end of2004 was estimated
at $35.9 billion. The debt crisis has been aggravated by the burden
of debt servicing, which has absorbed the nation's budgetary
and foreign exchange resources with deleterious impact on the
critical sectors of the economy. The paper critically examines
Nigeria's external debt profile and efforts toward its alleviation.
It argues that the debt burden constitutes a major constraint to
the revitalization of the nation's economy, and that its alleviation
is imperative for sustainable growth and development.
Nigeria's debt crisis has attracted considerable attention since the end of the
protracted military authoritarianism and the advent of a new democratic
dispensation in the country in May 1999. This is because the debt burden
constitutes a major constraint to the revitalization of the nation's battered
economy. There is indeed the fear that the crisis may worsen the debilitating
poverty and economic decline in which the country is trapped. Although
Nigeria is not alone among the countries experiencing acute levels of external
indebtedness, when compared to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa,
its external debt stock is precariously huge. The external debt profile of the
country at the advent of Obasanjo's second term as president in 2003 raised
many doubts about the fiscal sustainability ofthe regime's new economic policy.
The administration thus made the issue of debt cancellation a major plank of its
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reform agenda. This culminated in a series of debt negotiations with its major
bilateral creditors-the Paris Club.
Within this period, many articulate Nigerians, including the nation's legislators,
advocated for outright and unilateral debt repudiation. Such a radical option is,
however, considered inappropriate, particularly for a country like Nigeria, which
is marginalized in the power structure of the global economic system, because it
may attract consequences such as threat, blackmail, and possible ostracism by the
creditor nations (Babawale, 2004). For Nigeria to choose this option, the nation
must be ready to withstand any perceived act of blackmail or external opposition.
It has also been suggested that Nigeria could have endeavored to organize
a debtor's cartel in order to fight for debt cancellation. However, such a step
is easier to contemplate than to implement considering the manner in which
Nigeria and other Third World countries have deepened their integration into the
global economic system-a system that precariously walks against their interests
(Okafor, 2005).
A more effective and accommodating option is that of debt forgiveness.
As Ogbe submits,
Debt forgiveness or cancellation is, no doubt, the most complete
and effective strategy of debt relief. The principal debt is not only
extinguished but also the steady accumulation ofdebt that comes
from repeated debt rescheduling and the resulting capitalization
of interest and arrears are eradicated. Moreover, the sizeable
administrative and financial burdens associated with periodic
debt rescheduling are also eliminated. (Ogbe, 1992, p. 29)
Since the commencement of Obasanjo's second term as Nigeria's president
in 2003, the federal government has been making frantic efforts to secure debt
forgiveness/cancellation from its external creditors. A powerful economic team
chaired by the country's finance minister, Okonjo-Iweala, was constituted to
pursue an aggressive drive toward debt cancellation and sustained economic
reform. In July 2005, Nigeria got a reprieve for its astronomical external debt
overhang as the Paris Club, to which the country owed over 80% of its foreign
debt, granted it an $18 billion debt relief.
The paper presents an overview of Nigeria's debt profile, including the rising
trend in debt burden and the sustained efforts to alleviate it, leading to the
current escape from the debt trap. It begins by sketching out the magnitude and
severity of Africa's debt burden. It then discusses the evolution of Nigeria's debt
crisis as well as the ballooning of the debt particularly in the 1980s and up to the
beginning of the 21 st century. The paper also devotes considerable attention to
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the breakthrough attained by the Obasanjo administration following an intense
negotiation for debt relief/cancellation. Since corruption constitutes a major
avenue by which the nation's debt is grossly misused, the paper explores the
linkage between corruption and debt burden. It concludes by underscoring the
imperativeness of debt sustainability, the establishment of a relatively corruptionfree society, and the ability to keep Nigeria's economy in proper perspective.
Africa in Global Debt Crisis
Africa has long been engrossed in the morass of a debilitating external debt
crisis. The buildup of the debt constitutes part of the African economic crisis,
which, at the commencement ofthe 1980s, triggered serious attacks on the social
policies of the postcolonial state (Olukoshi, 2004). The critical aspect of the
continent's debt burden began in 1973 when OPEC members quadrupled the
price of oil and invested their excess money in Western commercial banks. The
banks, seeking investment for their new funds, appropriated substantial loans to
Africa and other developing nations, often without appropriately evaluating the
loan requests or monitoring how the borrowed monies were utilized (Caritas
International and CIDSE, 2006).
The scenario of Africa's multiplying debt burden has been well articulated
by Gavin Capps, who, quoting a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization,
Africa Action, states:
The ratios of foreign debt to the continent's gross national
product (GNP) rose from 51 % in 1982 to 100% in 1992, and its
debt grew to four times its export income in the 1990s. In 1998,
sub-Saharan Africa's debt stock was estimated at $236 billion,
and that of the whole continent was over $300 billion. Africa's
debt burden is twice that of any other region in the world-it
carries 11% of the developing countries' debt with only 5% of its
income. GNP in sub-Saharan Africa is $308 per capita, while its
external debt stands at $355 per capita. (Capps, 2005)
Capps explains how the debt burden has been compounded by the massive
overflows of resources to foreign creditors. He laments, in particular, the annual
debt service payments, which increased substantially from an average of $1.7
billion in 1970-79 to $14.6 billion in 1997-99, and the huge outflows of resources
that have been unmatched with inflows of new loans. For instance, from 1970 to
2002, the continent received $540 billion as loans while paying back $550 billion
and retaining $295 billion as total debt. Similarly, the 1990s witnessed a period
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of worsening resource transfers, and this continued into the ne mill
ium.
Although sub-Saharan Africa borrowed $11.4 billion in 2001, it paid ba
1.5
billion, which shows a net balance of $3.1 billion (Capps, 2005).
Africa Action has indeed painted a gloomy picture of Africa's debt. 0 t
of the debt is considered illegitimate because unrepresentative go' ernments
ere
during the period of Cold War patronage unjustly incurred it, as loan
generously given to corrupt African leaders who misappropriated the money
for their personal enrichment with full knowledge and support of the lenders
(Africa Action, 2005). For instance, the former Zaire (now Democratic Republic
of Congo) dictator Mobutu Sese Seko was, during much of the Cold War period,
granted more u.S. aid than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa combined, in spite of
the fact that the money was being frittered away into his Swiss bank account. This
perhaps informed the classification of debts accumulated during the period as
«odious" debt. Famakinwa throws more light on this:
African countries became indebted to international lenders as
they accepted loans for political and economic stabilization in
the post-independence era. In the context of the cold war, and
with massive revenue surpluses of oil money in western banks in
the 1970s, loans were made with little thought to their purpose
or to their recipients' capacity to repay the debt. Many were
made to retain the loyalty of corrupt regimes, and much of the
money went into the hands of unrepresentative and repressi
governments. (Famakinwa,2005)
Today, well after the Cold War era, most African states are still embe
external debt, and they seem not to be getting out of it in any funda.A. . . . "...
due essentially to the compounding of intere ts payable on the loan .
The debt trap in which Africa is current! engrossed is indeed q
As the New York Times editorialized: «Right now, African countrie
times as much on paying back debt as the do on healthcare. The
into making ever-escalating interest payments that never touch
(New York Times, 2005).
Against the background of the ceaseless campaign for canO~~Jlaltlol,n
Africa's over $300 billion debt, which has contributed enormou
the greatest obstacle to the continent's development, the G-8 na
meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, in 2005, decided to cancel th
African (and 4 Latin American) countries. Nigeria is one of the C01JDttnEs
were not included in the list, thus prompting the country to enga
talks with its bilateral creditors. This subsequently led to the can"'·~:lll.'~."'ft,·~.
'",,,L;I.
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60% of its external debt to the Paris Club. The next section ~races the background
to the country's external debt burden.
Evolution of Nigeria's Debt Burden

Nigeria's jumbo loan of$1 billion contracted from the international capital
market in 1978 constitutes the origin of the country's external debt burden
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2002). Although the country incurred some debt in
the 1960s, the debt burden did not weigh too heavily on the nation's economy
despite the fratricidal civil war that devastated the country between 1967 and
1970 (Olukoshi, 1990, p. 21). The general opinion that Nigeria was "underborrowed" led to the government's decision to increase its total external debt
outstanding; and while the debt stock rose throughout the 1970s, it was not
until the 1980s that it grew significantly (Center For Global Development,
2004). The country's total external debt stock rose phenomenally to $9 billion
in 1980. Between 1980 and 1983, both the federal and state governments
engaged in a massive and reckless borrowing spree, particularly from the
international capital market, leading to the draining of the country's reserves
and debilitating debt crisis (Olukoshi, 1990, p. 26). By 1985, the foreign debt
had increased astronomically to nearly $19 billion (Nigeria First, 2005).
The Central Bank of Nigeria has advanced four major factors responsible
for the increased size of the country's external debt, namely, the practice of:
(a) the rapid growth of public expenditure, particularly on capital project;
(b) borrowing from the international community at nonconcessional interest
rates; (c) the decline in oil earnings from the late 1970s; and (d) the dependence
on imports, which contributed to the emergence of trade arrears (Central
Bank of Nigeria, 2002). Other factors responsible for the rapid growth of the
ountry's external debt, particularly in the 1980s are (e) accumulation of debt
ervice arrears, (f) escalation of the market interest rate, especially in mid1989 when the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate peaked at 13% from 3 to 4%,
nd (g) -shortening maturities on loans (Nigeria First, 2005). Thus, by 1990,
igeria's external debt had risen to $33.1 billion. It declined to $27.5 billion
On 1991, but rose again steadily to $32.6 billion in 1995. The debt outstanding
t the end of 1999 stood at $28 billion. It increased to $29 billion in 2000
Central Bank of Nigeria, 2002).
As clearly underscored at an international conference on sustainable debt
trategy, Nigeria's debt burden had been increasing at an unsustainable rate
Once the beginning of the last decade, and the total,debt stock at the end of
arch 2001 stood at $28 billion, constituting about 65% of the country's GDP,
hile the average annual debt service amounted to $1.5 billion, an amount
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that is about 20 to 30% of total exports and 3 times the natio
budget, or 9 times the public health budget (Debt Management
It has been further revealed that from the Paris Club of creditors al
borrowed a total sum of $13 billion, but had paid the sum of 1
service payments, and yet, still owed a staggering amount of $22 b· .
essentially to compounding of interests, accumulation of arrears, and
invoked on late payments (Debt Management Office, 2001).
Addressing Nigerians on debt relief for the country, which he described as a
dividend ofdemocracy, Obasanjo queried, "How did we get to the point where our
debt burden became a challenge to peace, stability, growth, and development?"
(Obasanjo, 2005). He also identified the fundamental reasons for the debt burden.
According to him,
Without belaboring the point, we can identify political
rascality, bad governance, abuse of office and power, criminal
corruption, mismanagement and waste, misplaced priorities,
fiscal indiscipline, weak control, monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms, and a community that was openly tolerant of
corruption and other underhand and extra legal methods of
primitive accumulation. (Obasanjo, 2005)
Following the astronomical increase in the country's debt stock, the government
began to take drastic measures to arrest the disappointing situation. The Central
Bank of Nigeria draws attention to the follOwing measures taken by the Obasanjo
administration in order to reduce the burden of it external debt:
• Placing an embargo on ne loans to check the escalation of total debt
stock and minimize the problem of additional debt burden.
• Limiting debt service payments by setting aside a proportion of
export earnings to meet debt service obligations to allow for internal
development.
gh
• Restructuring debt by reducing the burden of an existing
refinancing, rescheduling, buy-back, issuance of colla
ds
and the provision of new money (Central Bank of ig .
In addition to these measures, the federal government
Management Office under the presidency for the sole p
and advising on the government's overall debt obligation.
measures, the nation's external debt continued skyrocket·
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The Ballooning of Debt
Despite significant attempts by government to effectively manage the existing
debt, it has continued to grow persistently, rising to $29.8 billion in 2002 (United
Nations Development Programme, 2005). In the recent past, empirical data from
the Debt Management Office as documented by the Central Bank of Nigeria
reveals that the country's external debt stock as of December 2004 stood at $35.9
billion, representing an increase of 9.2% over the $32.9 billon recorded in 2003.
The rise was informed by the capitalization ofunpaid interest charges on the Paris
Club debt and the U.s. dollar's depreciation (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2004).
The total stock ofNigeria's external debt in 2003 was $32.9 billion. The amount
owed to the bilateral creditors (mainly the Paris Club) was $27.5 billion or 84% of
the total stock, while that owed the multilateral creditors was $3.0 billion or 9% of
the entire stock. Within the same period, private creditors were owed $2.4 billion
or 7% of the total stock.
The scenario was a bit gloomy in the following year. As shown in Wiertsema
(2005), the composition of the country's external debt outstanding for the period
1985 to 2004 reveals that the total foreign debt increased substantially from $18.9
billion in 1985 to $35.9 billion in 2004. The Paris Club's share rose astronomically from
$7.8 billion in 1985 to $30.8 billion in 2004. The multilateral creditors' share similarly
increased from $1.3 billion in 1985 to $2.8 billion in 2004. The shares of commercial
creditors and other bilateral creditors, however, decreased from $7.8 billion and $1.9
billion respectively in 1985 to $2.2 billion and $0.0 billion respectively in 2004.
Moss (2005) shows that the bulk of the country's $32 billion external debt is
owed to a handful of bilateral creditors. Specifically, only four of the Paris Club
members (United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan) account for 65% of
the total debt, while the remaining 19% is accounted for by the other members
(including Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States). The general picture
depicted is that the bulk of Nigeria's external debt is owed to the Paris Club.
Nigeria's finance minister, Okonjo-Iweala, corroborated this when she asserted,
«Nigeria's debt problem is really Paris Club debt problem:' In an article entitled
"Understanding Nigerias Debt Situation~' she explained that Nigerias external
debt at tbe beginning ot l()()S stood at 'S34t bi\1ion, and that
About $28 billion or 85% of the debt is owed to the Paris Club of
15 creditor nations. Only 8% of the debt is owed to multilateral
institutions such as the African Development Bank and the
World Bank whilst the balance of 7% is owed to the London
Club of commercial creditors and holders of promissory notes.
(Okonjo-Iweala, 2005)
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On debt servicing, Global Development Finance (a publication ofthe orld Bank)
reveals that Nigeria's debt servicing figures vis-a-vis the country's GDP i 162%.
In spite of this, the debt burden has not shown any remarkable decrease.
The overall picture painted by this scenario indicates that Nigeria's external
debt seems to be rising ceaselessly and perpetually. As poignantly observed in an
official government document,
Nigeria is neck-deep in the debt trap. Debt has become a millstone
(an albatross) on Nigeria's neck, jeopardizing her economic
growth and compromising her social development. We spend
a lion's share of our national income servicing our debts leaving
little money for social services and infrastructure development
and even still much less for investment. In the process, we have
paid more than we originally borrowed, yet our debt-like a
malignant virus-continues to multiply. (Nigeria First, 2005)
Nigeria and many other debtor developing nations have thus remained not
only poor, but also severely burdened by debt overhang. Hence, there has been
persistent clamor for outright and unconditional cancellation of a substantial part
of their debt. Consequently, the Nigerian government embarked on a series of
negotiations in order to obtain a substantial reprieve from the external creditors.

Negotiating Debt Rescheduling/Relief/Cance ation
Considerable efforts have been made to reschedule Nigeria's mounting
bilateral debt. As Wiertsema insists, the Paris Club reached some agreement with
the country in 1986, 1989, and 1991. The deals approximate economic reforms in
line with International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions. The implementation
of the reform programs, however, did not provide the necessary capacity to meet
the country's total debt servicing requirements. Hence, in spite of the ne IMF
and World Bank supported economic programs, the country's GDP a peared
to be increasing far less than the increase in debt service obligation
der the
. ations,
rescheduling programs. Nigeria could therefore satisfy only part of'
requiring regular returns to the negotiating table (Wiertsema, 20 ~ .
Nigeria similarly tried to reschedule its commercial deb
Club between 1987 and 1989. For instance, the Brady Plan
that was adopted in 1989 allowed for the concession of
bonds at a substantial discount. Similarly, the country
the London Club in early 1992 an exchange deal for a ~~'h~'1U"J~"I~
Although a new debt relief arrangement, including de
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Club was due later in the same year, failure to return the country to democratic
rule led to the refusal of the Paris Club to continue negotiation with the military
dictators; and no lending or servicing occurred henceforth (Wiertsema, 2005).
Nigeria transited from military authoritarianism to civil democratic
dispensation in May 1999 when Obasanjo became the second executive
president and renewed negotiation for debt relief/cancellation with the Paris
Club of creditors. Following intense negotiation, particularly between 2003 and
2005, the Paris Club announced on June 29, 2005, a debt reduction framework
for Nigeria under which it canceled 60% of the country's debt owed it. This has
been considered the biggest ever debt stoc~ write-off of any African country. In
a momentous address to the nation on this remarkable feat, President Obasanjo
averred, ((What we have achieved now is worth celebrating because what we will
expect at the end ofthe exercise will be close to a relief of $20 billion which is well
beyond the total revenue of Nigeria for one year" (Obasanjo, 2005).
Commending the president on the landmark achievement, a former head of
state, Ernest Shonekan, remarked,
All Nigerians must appreciate the momentous feat, bearing in
mind the basis of our indebtedness, fruitless efforts over the
years by previous governments to gain these concessions, and
the necessary economic reforms and the dogged attention you
have paid to discipline and fighting corruption. (Shonekan,
quoted in Okonjo-Iweala, 2005)
Under the historic and unprecedented ad hoc agreement signed formally on
October 20,2005, Nigeria was granted an estimated $18 billion debt cancellation,
representing 60% of its external debt to the Paris group of creditors. The sum of
$12.4 billion balance, representing a regularization of arrears of $6.3 billion, plus
a balance of $6.1 billion to complete the exit strategy, was, according to Minister
ofFinance Okonjo-Iweala, to be sourced from the nations foreign reserves, which
had hit $26 billion including the excess crude oil proceeds of about $10 billion as
of the end of September 2005 (Aluko, 2005).
In a press release, the government provided the other highlights of the
agreement:
• The deal is the second largest in the history ofthe Paris Club, second only
to Iraq which, however, was staggered and phased over 3 years.
• The deal is anchored on Nigeria's new Policy Support Instrument
(PSI), endorsed by the IMF board. Nigeria is the first beneficiary of
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this arrangement, which is a further endorsement of
of its
homegrown NEEDS program.
• The buy-back option, which provides a complete exit or i eria, is
unprecedented and the first in the history of the Paris Club.
• It will allow the debt service of $1 billion to be put to po erty and
Millenium Development Goal related expenditure.
• Nigeria will be completely free of Paris Club debts, leaving only 5 billion
of total external debt owed to international multilateral organizations
and the private sector (Aluko, 2005).
A number of factors contributed to the historic breakthrough. These, as
underscored by Wiertsema (2005), include
• G-8 Agenda: At the behest of Prime Minister Tony Blair as the chairman
ofthe G-8 in 2005, the group's final declaration at its summit in Edinburgh
made explicit reference to the need for a debt cancellation offer to Nigeria
in the Paris Club.
• Nigeria's role in Africa: Since President Obasanjo assumed power in
1999, he has been playing a central role in African politics. Together
with South Africa, Nigeria became a leading force behind the New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Also, Nigeria
supplied troops for peacekeeping missions across the continent.
The sense that the international community owed Nigeria for such
services certainly increased.
• Oil prices: The substantial increase of oil prices allowed Nigeria to
earn much more money from its oil exports than originally foreseen.
Of these windfall profits, the Obasanjo administration set aside
substantial amounts.
• Strict budgeting policies of the creditor nations: Due to their strict
budgeting policies, several members of the Paris Club faced rather tight
government budgets. Partial payment by Nigeria of its substantial debt
arrears in exchange for debt cancellation would be helpful for the efforts
of creditor governments to solve their budget problems.
• Precedent of Iraq debt cancellation: In November 2004, the Paris Club
agreed to a substantial cancellation of 80% of the bilateral debt of Iraq. It
was therefore felt that a similar gesture should be extended to Nigeria.
Nigeria reacted spontaneously to the fulfillment of its part of the agreement by
paying $6.4 billion within 10 days, that is, by the end of October 2005; and by April
2006, the balance had been paid (NGEX News, 2006). The coun has thus been
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removed from an international credit blacklist and now has credit ratings similar
to other emerging market economies such as Turkey and Ukraine. In essence, the
Nigerian government now has the capacity to borrow money on international
capital markets on favorable terms if it desires to do so (Ogunjobi, 2006).
Corruption and Nigeria's External Debt Burden

Gross mismanagement ofresources, coupledwith unregulated and widespread
cases of official corruption by the country's leadership, has further compounded
Nigeria's debt crisis, which partly originated from the poor management ofloans.
Nigerian rulers have, for instance, allegedly stolen a huge sum of $412 billion
over the years (Ayittey, 2006). Similarly, Nigerians have reportedly siphoned
billions of dollars during the import licensing days. Indeed, as the Daily Times
editorialized, «Pervasive cases of official corruption have become a deregulated
concept now firmly rooted as our political le.adership and their instrument of
anti-graft, in fact, tacitly encourage the malaise" (Daily Times, 2003).
The Guardian newspaper underscored the same scenario in an editorial
commentary, which states thus: «History reveals that a high proportion ofNigeria's
external loans as well as export earnings vanished into private foreign accounts
while the projects for which loans were procured were either untraceable and
uncompleted or non-performing where they were executed" (Guardian, February
15, 2005, p. 28).
For the overwhelming portion of the country's debt, it has been estimated
that a large chunk was fraudulently salted away, by Nigerian leaders, in foreign
banks. For instance, during the Gulf crisis of the early 1990s, about $12 billion of
Nigeria's oil windfall was reported to have gone missing; while in the period 1993
through 1998, Abacha was confirmed to have stashed away as much as $5 billion
in Swiss, United Kingdom, German, and American banks (Africa Action, 2005).
There have also been instances in which external-sourced loans were
diverted to private hands, while privately initiated foreign loans have, in other
.,cases, been contracted by past leaders in the country's name. Similarly, corrupt
politicians and military dictators have, over the years, used a variety of conduits
to systematically hijack the proceeds of the national wealth, with invoicing fraud
a common method. Over-invoicing, in particular, has been used as an avenue
for frittering resources away from the country. Import licenses, because they
provided access to foreign currencies, were frivolously used as patronage to
reward political service. The practice had a serious impact on t.he nation's foreign
reserves and external debt. For instance, it has been estimated that by 1983, the
nation's foreign exchange siphoned out of the country amounted to about $7.5
billion or about 40% of the nation's foreign debt (Adams, 1991, pp. 135-136).
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The intensity of the kleptocratic tendency in the country continued to rise
in vitality such that at a certain time: "The size of the money kept by individual
Nigerians in foreign bank accounts (as once) estimated (was) at parity with the
national debt and some billions above 33 billion dollars owed by the country to
international finance institutions" (Ofeimun, quoted in Akindele, 2000, p. 27).
An important dimension to the debt crises particularly in the 1980s was
the inability to ascertain accurately the actual value of the country's external
indebtedness. A considerable amount ofdebt had been incurred through extensive
borrowing by state governments and private importers, who often entered into
trade agreement with overseas firms without the knowledge or authority of the
federal government. As Dike observes, most of these deals entailed colossal
amounts: "The amount of fraud involved was enormous: Overseas suppliers had
padded their invoices (over-invoicing) with the collusion of Nigerian importers
and state bureaucrats, who used that device to divert large amounts of foreign
exchange into foreign bank accounts" (Dike, 1990, p. 107).
In spite of this startling revelation, successive governments in Nigeria have
blatantly failed to confront the fundamental issue of corruption decisivel~
This perhaps informed Obasanjds dogged determination to tackle the menace
of corruption head on. In order to address the issue quite meaningfully, the
administration established two anticorruption commissions to play a number of
interrelated roles, including "surveillance, investigation of allegations or suspicions
of corruption, apprehension of suspects through the police and prosecution in law
courts" (Ninalowo, 2005, p. 37). The commissions are the Independent Corrupt
Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission
(EFCC). Although the ICPC has not made much progress toward achieving its
goals, the EFCC has made tremendous efforts to stamp out corruption and financial
crimes in the poli~ For instance, in late 2005, the commission commenced
investigating some serving state governors who had allegedly siphoned away from
the country a large chunk ofmoney; and as ofDecember 2005, the commission had
secured 25 convictions (Olurode, 2005, p. 11).
Conclusion: Prospects and Challenges

One of the most critical macroeconomic problems of the igerian state is
the depth of its external debt. Indeed, Nigeria's astronomical foreign debt burden
has constituted a major impediment to the revitalization of it hattered economy
and alleviation of the nation's debilitating poverty (Arika e, 2001). The Nigerian
economy has continued to experience stresses and strains ari ing from excruciating
debt burden and excessive debt overhang in spite of the frantic effort by the Debt
Management Office to confront the debt difficulty (Omoruyi, 99 ,p. 357).
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Much of the debt owed by the country was contracted under military
regimes that were not accountable to Nigerians. The processes and modalities
through which the debts were attained were shrouded in mystery and
controversies because they lacked transparency and accountability. Since
Nigeria's transition from military authoritarianism and the recognition of
the crucial linkage between debt, poverty, development, and the survival of
the country's nascent democratic system, much priority attention has been
attached to the critical issue of debt reduction as a major component of the
current government's development strategy.
Different strategies have been evolved in order to fundamentally confront
the issue. The major planks ofthe strategies include regularizing relations with
the global finance community to pave the way for constructive engagement,
negotiating favorable terms for debt restructuring and rescheduling under
"traditional)) debt relief mechanisms in the short run, and building on that
in the medium term in order to secure deeper and more substantial debt
reduction (Arikawe, 2001). This culminated in the series of negotiations that
led to the 60% debt reduction granted Nigeria by the Paris Club, the balance
of which was liquidated in May 2006.
Having triumphed over the external debt crisis, Nigeria must reconstruct
its national priorities and put its economy in proper perspective. The
current economic reforms policy should be vigorously pursued by the
present administration and tenaciously sustained by future governments in
the country. Adoption of a proper and efficient debt management strategy
is a fundamental national imperative if the country is to avoid future debt
crisis. This will entail adherence to legal and accountability frameworks and
commitment to building national capacity for debt management. In addition,
policy makers should go beyond the level of efficient debt management and
devote considerable attention to the use of borrowed funds to ensure that
capacity for repayment has been adequately created while simultaneously
ensuring that the required value is received.
In view of the continuous rise in oil prices, accentuated by the series of
uprisings in the Middle East, and the unprecedented excess crude oil money
accruable to Nigeria, a special Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) account should
be opened with the Central Bank of Nigeria with all the excess crude oil funds
diverted to it. The annual interest returns, which could run into millions of
dollars, should be channeled annually to critical sectors ofthe economy such as
education, health, and poverty reduction. Furthermore, all the multinational
oil companies operating in the country should be compelled to pay a small
percentage (e.g., 2%) of their annual profits directly into the special PTF
consolidated fund as part of their contributions toward the developmental
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needs of the country. To assure the multinationals that the mone ill not be
misappropriated or frittered away (as is usually the case with such monies), a
proper account of the proceeds should be made public annually.
Finally, deliberate commitment toward sustaining the current dri e against
corruption must be vigorously explored by the government. A number of
concrete measures should be put in place to combat the menace of corruption in
the Nigerian polity. Such measures should be constructed along a renewed effort
at institutional reforms designed to enhance transparency and accountability
in the operations of the state and important economic institutions. To achieve
meaningful results, the two anticorruption commissions in the country-the
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission and the Economic and Financial
Crime Commission-should be totally independent and devoid of executive
interference or manipulation and should be given the necessary investigative
powers to ensure their optimum performance as the nation passes through the
current major historical milestone.

EndNotes

The paper was originally presented to faculty members at Kennesaw State
University, Kennesaw, Georgia, United States, at a seminar organized by the
Institute for Global Initiatives, in collaboration with the Department of Political
Science and International Affairs, Kennesaw State University, on July 24, 2006,
at the International House of the University. The author gratefully acknowledges
the useful comments on the paper by Professor Michele Zebich-Knos and Dr.
Thomas Doleys, both of the Department of Political Science and International
Affairs, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, Georgia, United States.
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